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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE
LEARNING, AND BIAS IN FINANCE: TOWARD
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION
Kristin Johnson,* Frank Pasquale** & Jennifer Chapman***
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, a growing number of digital startups launched bids
to lure business from the financial services industry.1 Armed with what they
claim are vast quantities of data and sophisticated algorithmic platforms
capable of interpreting the data,2 these financial technology (“fintech”)3

* McGlinchey Stafford Professor of Law, Gordon Gamm Faculty Fellow, Tulane University
Law School.
** Piper & Marbury Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School
of Law; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society Project.
*** Ryan H. Easley Research Fellow, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. This Essay was prepared for the Symposium entitled Rise of the Machines: Artificial
Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, hosted by the Fordham Law Review
and the Neuroscience and Law Center on February 15, 2019, at Fordham University School
of Law. We would like to thank Kathleen Engel for her comments on the draft.
1. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Fintech Firms Are Taking On the Big Banks, but Can They
Win?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/
business/dealbook/fintech-firms-are-taking-on-the-big-banks-but-can-they-win.html
[https://perma.cc/8Z6C-DWKQ]; The Fintech Revolution, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changing-financeforbetter-fintech-revolution [https://perma.cc/UWF3-Z7PZ].
2. FTC, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?, at i (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusionunderstanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/R44Z-P4P5].
3. In previous publications, Frank Pasquale has examined “incrementalist” fintech,
which utilizes technology to provide standard financial services, and “futurist” fintech, in
which the entire financial system is remade due to distributed technologies. See Exploring the
Fintech Landscape: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 115th
Cong. (2017) (statement of Frank Pasquale, Professor of Law, University of Maryland). In
this Essay, we use the term “fintech firms” to refer to nondepository financial services firms
that integrate artificial intelligence technology and predictive analytics into their business
models. We acknowledge that, while there is no universally adopted definition for the term
“fintech,” many use the term as a catchall for a broader group of financial services firms that
integrate a diverse body of technologies and engage in digital transfers, storage, payments
systems, and lending, as well as the origination of virtual currency and robo-advising. See,
e.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 232, 238–40 (2018).
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firms have revived long-standing debates regarding the architectural design,4
regulatory framework,5 and role of the financial services industry.6
Financial product developers and financial service providers have long
engaged statistical and probability models as well as predictive analytics to
forecast performance.7 So fintech is not entirely new. However, sometimes
a change in quantity can amount to a change in quality. That may be
happening in fintech now, as the inclusion of increasingly comprehensive
databases, as well as new methods of analysis, means that many fintech firms
deploy extremely complex algorithms (including assemblages of earlier
models) to predict the likelihood of repayment and profitability of
customers.8 According to some futurists, financial markets’ automation will
substitute increasingly sophisticated, objective, analytical, model-based
assessments of, for example, a borrower’s creditworthiness for direct human
evaluations irrevocably tainted by bias and subject to the cognitive limits of
the human brain.9 However, even if they do occur, such advances may
violate other legal principles.10
Consider, for example, the application of learning algorithms in credit
markets. Some fintech firms aim to adapt learning algorithms to consider
nontraditional data in assessing creditworthiness11 and claim that they will
integrate historically excluded individuals into credit markets and expand
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015) (arguing for a “public option” in
consumer banking); E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ARE BANKS
SPECIAL?: ANNUAL REPORT 1982 (1982), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/
annual-reports/ar/annual-report-1982-complete-text [https://perma.cc/9V29-W9V8] (raising
fundamental questions regarding the role of banks and discussing their prudential regulation).
7. ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA CORNETT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENT:
A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 97–103 (9th ed. 2017).
8. See infra Part I. Note that customers who are late with payments may be much more
profitable than a traditionally good credit risk, since they will be paying more in interest and
fees.
9. OECD, FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSURANCE AND PENSIONS: DIGITALISATION AND
FINANCE 10–13 (2018), https://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/Financial-marketsinsurance-pensions-digitalisation-and-finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW8N-RPXL].
10. See, e.g., Odia Kagan, Finnish DPA Orders Company to Modify Automated
Creditworthiness Assessment, Improve Disclosures, FOX ROTHSCHILD (Apr. 27, 2019),
https://dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/2019/04/articles/european-union/finnish-dpa-orderscompany-to-modify-automated-creditworthiness-assessment-improve-disclosures/
[https://perma.cc/3K55-8MXN] (reporting that the Finnish Data Protection Authority ordered
a firm to “provide individuals with information on the logic behind the decision-making
process, its relevance to the credit decision and its consequences for the borrower” pursuant
to the General Data Protection Regulation’s provisions guaranteeing a right to an explanation).
11. Examining the Use of Alternative Data in Underwriting and Credit Scoring to Expand
Access to Credit: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 4–6_(2019)
(statement of Kristin N. Johnson, McGlinchey Stafford Professor of Law and Associate Dean
of Faculty Research, Tulane University Law School); see also Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine
Lemieux, The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence
from the Lending Club Consumer Platform (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No.
18-15, 2018), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/
working-papers/2018/wp18-15r.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TT9-U6A3].
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access to credit to the thirty-three million unbanked and underbanked
households in the United States,12 as well as the nearly two billion
individuals and families globally who lack access to financial services13—a
group disproportionately composed of women and people of color.14
How might fintech firms accomplish such a lofty goal? Early fintech firms
promising to better integrate underresourced communities into financial
services markets typically introduced digital money transfer services that
facilitated cash distributions among users (such as PayPal, Apple Pay, or
Venmo)15 and credit platforms that offered digitally distributed consumer
loans. Money transmission services can provide vital peer-to-peer platforms
for those who lack access to conventional bank branches or personal
checking and savings accounts. Because credit is an indisputably important
resource for low-income families in smoothing consumption16 and creating
economic stability,17 evaluating the integration of automated decisionmaking algorithms in credit markets raises underexplored normative
concerns including the transparency and accountability obligations of fintech
firms, the social welfare effects of permitting fintech firms to operate in credit
markets, and the necessity of effective state and federal supervision of fintech
firms’ pricing (interest rates), marketing techniques, and structuring of credit
products.
With a few quick taps on a smart phone, consumers can access a growing
universe of apps that offer discounted interest rates on consumer loans to
borrowers with “near prime,” “subprime,” and well-below subprime credit

12. FDIC, 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2018),
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7TP-SMHZ] (indicating that 6.5 percent of U.S. households (or 8.4 million
households) were unbanked in 2017 and 18.7 percent of U.S. households (24.2 million) were
underbanked, meaning that the household had a checking or savings account but also obtained
financial products and services outside of the banking system).
13. ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL., WORLD BANK GRP., THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE
2017: MEASURING FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE FINTECH REVOLUTION 4 (2018),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/332881525873182837/pdf/126033-PUBPUBLIC-pubdate-4-19-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHT7-R7P8] (indicating that “about 1.7
billion adults remain unbanked—without an account at a financial institution or through a
mobile money provider”).
14. See generally Louise Seamster, Black Debt, White Debt, CONTEXTS, Winter 2019, at
30.
15. Adam Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils of Digital Wallets,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 335 (2018).
16. Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending
Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 522 (2011) (indicating that loans give families flexibility “in
managing consumption over time” yet may create “substantial debt service burdens”).
17. See, e.g., Christine L. Dobridge, For Better and for Worse?: Effects of Access to HighCost Consumer Credit (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2016-056, 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016056pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PFP-G5VC] (“[P]ayday credit access improves well-being for households
in distress by helping them smooth consumption. In periods of temporary financial distress—
after extreme weather events like hurricanes and blizzards—I find that payday loan access
mitigates declines in spending on food, mortgage payments, and home repairs. In an average
period, however, I find that access to payday credit reduces well-being.”).
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scores.18 For proponents, the launch of fintech firms marks a new frontier in
the ever-expanding utopian vision of the “technological sublime” or faithlike devotion to the potential for technology to transform us into a more
equitable and just society.19
Consumer advocates are justifiably skeptical. While legally prohibited
today, well-documented discriminatory,20 exclusionary, and predatory credit
market practices persist.21 In light of creditors’ history of exploiting
unbanked and underbanked communities, even fintech firms’ plans for
greater inclusion demand careful scrutiny.
Consider the disturbing tales emerging of digital debt platforms peddling
payday loan–style arrangements masked by the opaque and unassailable
shroud of innovation and financial inclusion.22 Kevin Donovan and Emma
Park share harrowing narratives of aggressive marketing campaigns by text
message that entice borrowers already consumed by “perpetual debt” to
borrow at expensive, ballooning interest rates.23 Further, in the event that
they fail to repay the loans, some fintech firms harass overextended
borrowers with incessant and embarrassing payment alerts on their mobile
phones.24 Cash-strapped borrowers who lack the resources to meet their
daily expenses enter a downward spiral of indebtedness. Borrowers on the
18. Sarah McBride, ZestFinance Targets Loans at the Cream of Subprime Borrowers,
REUTERS (July 14, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venture-zestfinance-subprime/
zestfinance-targets-loans-at-the-cream-of-subprime-borrowers-idUSKCN0PP0B320150715
[https://perma.cc/74BK-SPG8].
19. See generally VINCENT MOSCO, THE DIGITAL SUBLIME: MYTH, POWER, AND
CYBERSCAPE (2004); DAVID E. NYE, AMERICAN TECHNOLOGICAL SUBLIME (1994).
20. Louise Seamster & Raphaël Charron-Chénier, Predatory Inclusion and Education
Debt: Rethinking the Racial Wealth Gap, 4 SOC. CURRENTS 199, 199–200 (2017) (describing
the targeting of minority homebuyers and students who borrow to fund mortgage or education
debt as predatory inclusion); Richard Rothstein, A Comment on Bank of
America/Countrywide’s Discriminatory Mortgage Lending and Its Implications for Racial
Segregation, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.epi.org/publication/bp335-boacountrywide-discriminatory-lending
[https://perma.cc/28RB-BF6V]
(describing
the
Department of Justice’s settlement with Bank of America and concluding that “[t]he lending
industry seems to have systematically targeted African Americans and Hispanics for these
risky subprime loans”).
21. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, From Credit Denial to
Predatory Lending: The Challenge of Sustaining Minority Homeownership, in SEGREGATION:
THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 81 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008).
22. Kevin P. Donovan & Emma Park, Perpetual Debt in the Silicon Savannah, BOS. REV.
(Sept. 20, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality-global-justice/kevin-p-donovanemma-park-perpetual-debt-silicon-savannah [https://perma.cc/BPQ4-XMBZ] (exploring
fintech platforms in Kenya that offer access to credit “with speed and ease” to “millions of
Kenyans in need”); Wonga’s Woes Spell the End of the Payday-Loan Era, ECONOMIST (Aug
30, 2018), https://www.economist.com/britain/2018/08/30/wongas-woes-spell-the-end-ofthe-payday-loan-era [https://perma.cc/9QCH-XMUR] (describing the fall of the British
payday lender Wonga).
23. Donovan & Park, supra note 22. For other examples of fintech firms offering paydaystyle loans, see CASHNETUSA, https://www.cashnetusa.com/ [https://perma.cc/W53B-4Y7F]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019) and Sean Farrell, Where Did It All Go Wrong for Wonga?,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/aug/07/wonga-loanswhere-did-it-all-go-wrong [https://perma.cc/THR6-C2DL].
24. Donovan & Park, supra note 22.
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debt treadmill intensify efforts to earn money only to face a “wageless life”—
enslaved by and laboring to repay outstanding digital debt.25
This regime of indebtedness is nothing new for underserved communities
that lack savings and enter into personal unsecured loans to overcome
emergencies or to fund basic household needs.26 Low-income consumers
pay remarkably more for basic financial services such as check cashing,
money transfers, and short-term loans.27
Without access to credit on fair and reasonable terms, it can be
extraordinarily expensive to be poor.28 For families with fragile financial
circumstances, credit may serve as a lifeline, enabling them to meet shortterm debt obligations.29 Due to the rising costs of education, housing, health
care, and even food, ever more consumers navigate an ever-widening web of
debt. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Center for
Microeconomic Data, at the close of the second quarter of 2019, families and
individuals faced over $13 trillion in debt obligations.30 Students and their
families currently owe approximately $1.5 trillion in student loan debt, even

25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Dalie Jimenez, Ending Perpetual Debts, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 610 (2018)
(“[L]aw and practice conspire to create a class of virtually perpetual debts that psychologically
and actually burden those individuals for much longer than economically and socially
justified.”); see also Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV.
855, 857 (2007) (“Payday lenders offer short-term loans at high interest rates to consumers
with impaired credit histories. . . . The duration, amount, and fee all can differ from provider
to provider, but as a general rule, the loans are small, the repayment period is short, and the
annualized interest rate is high. [For] example, with a fee of $30 for a two-week loan of $200,
the annual interest rate is almost 400 percent.”); Nathalie Martin & Robert N. Mayer, What
Communities Can Do to Rein In Payday Lending: Strategies for Successful Local Ordinance
Campaigns Through a Texas Lens, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (2017); Mehrsa
Baradaran, Opinion, Payday Lending Isn’t Helping the Poor. Here’s What Might, WASH.
POST (June 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/06/28/
payday-lending-isnt-helping-the-poor-heres-what-might/
[https://perma.cc/8CJZ-3GSR]
(“These loans do not make customers better off. Many stay indebted for months or even years
and most pay interest rates of between 300 to 2,000 percent. By the time they’ve paid off the
loan, they are further in the hole than when they started.”).
27. See Alyssa Yun, Financial Exclusion: Why It Is More Expensive to Be Poor,
WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 2, 2017), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
/live/news/1895-financial-exclusion-why-it-is-more-expensive-to-be/for-students/blog/
news.php [https://perma.cc/F7TM-FGEX].
28. Barbara Ehrenreich, It Is Expensive to Be Poor, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/it-is-expensive-to-be-poor/282979/
[https://perma.cc/KS82-V5FY] (giving examples of ways the poor spend more on basic needs,
such as housing, food, and childcare).
29. On the dangers of making credit a key determinant of whether and how basic needs
are met, see generally Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 1093 (2019).
30. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT
(2019),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/
HHDC_2019Q2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE3B-AAQV].
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as federal promises of loan forgiveness are under threat.31 Homeowners have
borrowed $9 trillion in mortgage debt.32
Consumers’ general distrust of legacy financial institutions,33 frustration
with scandals in financial markets,34 and the pervasive abuses and exclusion
of underserved communities by financial institutions paved the way for
insurgent fintech firms to capture a rapidly increasing role in consumer
financial services markets.35 Fintech firms are set to capitalize on the
efficiencies generated by machine learning, a form of artificial intelligence,36
to lower transaction fees, increase the rates paid on savings deposits, and
expedite financial transfers and payments in real time.37 While some fintech
firms operate as digital-only, end-to-end platforms that directly service
individuals and families, others partner with conventional, state or federally
chartered, financial intermediaries such as depository banks.38 Collectively,
these fintech firms comprise a new class of competitors: neo-banks.
As artificial intelligence increasingly influences the terms and availability
of credit, this nascent technology will perform key gatekeeping functions,
determining who receives access to credit and on what terms. For those with
access, algorithms may decide all material terms of any credit arrangement.39
31. Id.; Cory Turner, Congress Promised Student Borrowers a Break. Education Dept.
Rejected 99% of Them, NPR (Sept. 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/05/
754656294/congress-promised-student-borrowers-a-break-then-ed-dept-rejected-99-of-them
[https://perma.cc/2Y8L-KA2L].
32. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 30.
33. Drew McKone, Distrust of Large Institutions Makes This the Year of the Community
Bank, AM. BANKER (Feb. 10, 2017, 9:55 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
distrust-of-large-institutions-makes-this-the-year-of-the-community-bank
[https://perma.cc/BH3J-TPUF].
34. Wells Fargo Now Says 3.5 Million Affected by Sales Scandal, Up from 2.1 Million,
CHI. TRIB. (Aug 31, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-wells-fargo-fakeaccounts-20170831-story.html [https://perma.cc/62ED-7J9M].
35. See Kate Rooney, Small Banks You’ve Never Heard of Are Quietly Enabling the Tech
Takeover of the Financial Industry, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/02/15/small-banks-youve-never-heard-of-quietly-power-the-booming-fintech-industry-.html [https://perma.cc/452Y-23D4].
36. We use the general term “artificial intelligence” to refer to a diverse but related body
of technologies that simulate human decision-making and learning behavior. The
technologies include, among others, machine learning, deep learning, and neural networks.
See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 880 (2016).
37. Brian Chappatta, Robinhood Just Launched a 3% Checking and Savings Plan. It’s
Really Just a Dressed-Up Money Market Mutual Fund, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-robinhood-checking-plan-20181214-story.html
[https://perma.cc/85WK-UJZG]; Laura Noonan, Digital Bank Simple Raises Stakes in US
Deposits Battle, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4fe54b16-c05a11e8-95b1-d36dfef1b89a [https://perma.cc/B7Q2-NV7F]. But see Baiju Bhatt & Vlad Tenev,
A Letter from Our Founders, ROBINHOOD (Dec. 14, 2018), https://blog.robinhood.com/news/
2018/12/14/a-letter-from-our-founders [https://perma.cc/RAM4-XKFN] (signaling that
Robinhood may not be permitted by regulators to structure its cash management strategy as
anticipated).
38. See infra Part II.A.
39. Lenore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, How to Best Regulate Fintech, ROOSEVELT
INST. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/how-best-regulate-fintech/ [https://
perma.cc/8HS6-4ST5].
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In other words, learning algorithms may help regulators and lenders fulfill an
altruistic promise of inclusion, compensating for decades of discrimination
and exclusion in financial markets. However, should learning algorithms fail
to fulfill this promise, fintech firms may hardwire predatory inclusion,
existing inequities, and unconscious biases into financial markets for the next
several generations, compounding wealth gaps and undermining the welfare
of the most vulnerable communities.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes fintech firms’ integration
of learning algorithms and their anticipated economic and social welfare
benefits—enhanced efficiency, accuracy, and accessibility. Part II sketches
the emerging regulatory landscape. Over the last decade, federal banking
regulators signaled and adopted policies that preempted state regulatory
authority over fintech firms. In the summer of 2018, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced its intention to allow fintech
firms to apply for special purpose charters that would permit fintech firms to
operate, in many respects, as national banks (“Fintech Charter Decision”).
Consistent with a decades-long campaign to expand the scope of its authority,
the OCC’s seemingly innocuous announcement reflects the agency’s
increasingly aggressive interpretation of the scope of its statutory mandate.40
The OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision creates gaps in the supervision of
fintech firms and encourages market participants to engage in regulatory
arbitrage. Part II argues that federal special purpose charters set the stage for
regulatory arbitrage and may enable fintech firms to minimize their exposure
to state antidiscrimination and consumer protection regulations. Reducing
regulatory oversight of these important legal and ethical norms in a dynamic
and evolving market defined by a technology that may import unconscious
biases and disadvantage lower-income individuals and families raises red
flags.
Part III concludes with brief reflections regarding the necessity for courts
and regulators to balance the promised benefits of fintech firms’ neo-banking
initiatives with the historic and special gatekeeping role of banking
platforms. Unilateral deregulatory action by state or federal regulators may
undermine efforts to ensure effective oversight of fintech firms that seek to
extend access to safe and affordable banking services.
I. NEO-BANKING ON THE RISE
A. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Future of Finance
Emerging credit intermediaries aim to capitalize on a new generation of
consumers and their preference for using mobile devices to shop, make
payments, and manage finances. These platforms aspire to capture a portion
of fees associated with scoring, lending, and servicing a massive consumer
debt market (estimated to be nearing $14 trillion as of June 2019).41
40. See infra Part II.
41. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 30; Mark DeCambre, U.S. Consumer Debt
Is Now Above Levels Hit During the 2008 Financial Crisis, MARKETWATCH (June 25, 2019),
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Bypassing the collection of tedious paper applications and cumbersome
supporting documentation, digital credit decisions reduce the cost of
underwriting.42 Beyond these gains, empirical studies establish that
advanced statistical models and predictive analytics enhance lenders’ ability
to calculate default and prepayment risks.43 Fintech advocates celebrate the
introduction of automated decision-making (ADM) platforms, claiming that
ADM platforms mitigate risks related to discrimination against legally
protected groups since a computer system is not, in and of itself, capable of
the mental processes (whether conscious calculation or barely conscious
emotions or unconscious bias) associated with humans’ discriminatory
action.44 According to its advocates, ADM eliminates some pernicious
animus.45 However, ADM may only shift the locus of discrimination from
the bank manager’s desk to the programmer’s computer screen or to the data
scientists’ training sets since data are never brute or raw—they are always
collected, analyzed, and used by people, who may have the same conscious
calculations, barely conscious emotions, or unconscious biases at play in
their own observations. Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies may
aggregate data or analyze information gathered and processed through image
or voice data that reflect unconscious bias.46 Disparate impacts are also, of
course, a major concern.
To enhance predictive capabilities, AI methods rely on supervised and
unsupervised learning.47 This refers to how the algorithm optimizes its
output based on repeated analyses of the data set. In supervised learning, the
algorithm is trained with well-labeled and classified data, whereas there are
no training data in unsupervised learning.48 Unsupervised learning infers
information from the data set and can be highly resource intensive, as the
data set is tested against a massive number of potential patterns.49 Neural
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-consumer-debt-is-now-breaching-levels-lastreached-during-the-2008-financial-crisis-2019-06-19 [https://perma.cc/B5LH-9DFV].
42. Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk
Pricing, and Alternative Information (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17,
2017),
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/workingpapers/2017/wp17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2J5-4553].
43. Amir Khandani et al., Consumer Credit-Risk Models via Machine-Learning
Algorithms, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2767, 2787 (2010).
44. Potential Benefits and Risks of the Increased Use of Data in Financial Services
Applications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 116th Cong.
(2018) (statement of Brian Knight, Director, Innovation and Governance Program, Mercatus
Center at George Mason University).
45. See FTC, supra note 2, at 19.
46. Rich, supra note 36, at 873.
47. See generally ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE LEARNING (2d ed. 2010).
48. For accessible explanations of supervised and unsupervised learning, see Bernard
Marr, Supervised v Unsupervised Machine Learning—What’s the Difference?, FORBES (Mar.
16, 2017, 3:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/03/16/supervised-vunsupervised-machine-learning-whats-the-difference/ [https://perma.cc/HV5A-PJDF] and
Devin Soni, Supervised vs. Unsupervised Learning, MEDIUM (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/supervised-vs-unsupervised-learning-14f68e32ea8d
[https://perma.cc/5JKS-43F5].
49. Marr, supra note 48; Soni, supra note 48.
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networks, common algorithms in supervised learning, mimic aspects of the
human brain in order to generate results that older methods of statistical
analysis could not produce.50
Like traditional algorithms, AI can provide an analytic predicate for
ADM.51 Unlike traditional algorithms, however, much of contemporary AI
is either opaque or so complex that an effort to explain its “reasoning” would
be about as useful as a map of all the synapses and other chemical reactions
in the brain that occur when, say, a manager decides whether to grant or deny
an employee’s request for a vacation day.52 Machine learning is an
application of AI that trains algorithms to improve on algorithmically
programmed decision-making processes, meaning the algorithm may assess
the shortcomings in its decision-making process in early iterations and
improve upon its analyses and predictions regarding likely outcomes based
on the data.53
Machine learning can automatically detect patterns in data.54 Upon
discovering patterns, machine learning can be programmed to apply these
patterns to predict future outcomes based on the supplied data.55 These
methods engage in complex decision-making and apply logic to resolve
uncertainty.56
With ample and ongoing data inputs, machine learning enables an
algorithm or ensembles of algorithms engaged in “continuous improvement
on a given task” to improve performance.57 However, it is important to
understand the term “learning” here as a metaphor and not “the more holistic
concept referred to when people speak of human learning.”58 As Michael
Rich has observed, “machine learning does not require a computer to engage
in higher-order cognitive skills like reasoning or understanding of abstract
concepts.”59 This leaves AI methods vulnerable to pursuing forms of
analysis that might be set aside as suspect by a seasoned finance professional
(whether an attorney, analyst, trader, or other professional).60
50. See generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE
ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD (2015).
51. Rich, supra note 36, at 880.
52. See Frank Pasquale, Bittersweet Mysteries of Machine Learning, LSE: MEDIA POL’Y
PROJECT BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/02/05/
bittersweet-mysteries-of-machine-learning-a-provocation/ [https://perma.cc/4LS4-Y6LN].
Please note that this analogy is not meant to imply that neural networks accurately simulate or
otherwise match the complexity of the human brain. See generally John Horgan, THE
UNDISCOVERED MIND: HOW THE HUMAN BRAIN DEFIES REPLICATION, MEDICATION, AND
EXPLANATION (1999).
53. See Liane Colonna, A Taxonomy and Classification of Data Mining, 16 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 309, 313–29 (2013).
54. Rich, supra note 36, at 874.
55. Id.
56. KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 1–24 (2012).
57. Rich, supra note 36, at 880.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. On the importance of AI complementing, rather than replacing, human judgment, see
generally Frank Pasquale, Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning, BOUNDARY 2, Feb. 2019, at 73 and Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell,
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Instead “machine learning applies inductive techniques to often-large sets
of data to ‘learn’ rules that are appropriate to a task.”61 In other words, the
“intelligence” of a machine learning algorithm is oriented to outcomes, not
process; a “smart” algorithm is designed to reach consistently accurate results
on a chosen task, even if the algorithm does not “think” like a person.
Machine learning is in this way reminiscent of an idiot savant: like a
calculator multiplying fifteen-digit numbers faster than any human can, in a
narrow, well-specified area, it can reach conclusions faster than any human
can.62 As more dimensions of optimal outcomes are added to the solution
space, machine learning may gradually improve with “experience” (that is,
more data sets, which of course can often only be constructed with a great
deal of contingent and contestant human work to gather and “clean” data).63
However, complicated and ill-defined problems are hard to even pose to a
machine learning system. One key question for those advocating machine
learning in finance is whether underwriting and similar decisions can and
should be simplified and coarsened to match the available technology, or
whether they are more properly kept at extant levels of complexity.
Learning algorithms model, but cannot replicate, the complexities of
cognition and emotion that are the hallmarks of human thinking processes.
Instead, these algorithms analyze data sets to predict outcomes.64 Although
computers can mimic human decision-making now, they will need to evolve
quite a long way to even begin to replicate in silico what is commonly done
in the human brain.
The details of machine learning help mark critical distinctions between
human and computer decision-making. In machine learning, an initial data
set is subdivided into a training set, a verification set or validation set, and a
test set.65 The algorithm begins by analyzing the training set, thereby
learning the initial group classification rules.66 For example, a machinevision algorithm to distinguish images of light brown dogs from those of light
brown bagels may “learn” that most bagels lack the characteristic pattern of
three dark areas (eyes and a nose) possessed by nearly all images of dogs’
faces.67 These classification rules are then applied to a verification or
validation set and the results are then used to optimize the rules’
Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 63, 65
(2018).
61. Rich, supra note 36, at 880.
62. Id. at 873.
63. Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 148, 159 (2016).
64. See Rich, supra note 36, at 881.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. This may seem like a trivial problem, but it can be difficult. See Michael Schramm,
‘Puppy or Bagel’ Game Will Keep You Guessing, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2016, 6:32 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/college/2016/03/10/puppy-or-bagel-game-will-keep-youguessing/37414107/ [https://perma.cc/3C3T-AJ28]. Note, too, that a baby would likely learn
the distinction between a dog or a bagel after a few encounters with each; a machine learning
program may take hundreds or thousands of images to do so.
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parameters.68 Lastly, “the optimized rules are applied to the test set” and the
results of this stage establish a confidence level and support level for each
rule69: “Rules with a low support level are less likely to be statistically
significant. . . . The confidence level of a rule describes how often objects
in the test set follow the rule. It is, in essence, a measure of the strength of
the algorithm’s prediction.”70
The key to developing the algorithms used in these situations is to evaluate
the output of each algorithm with the desired result; this allows the machine
to learn by making its own connections within available data.71 Algorithms
tend to be trained using a four-step process.72 Google Image’s image
recognition learning algorithm is a classic example of this process.73 First,
the algorithm is shown a set of known images (for example, ten thousand
pictures of ducks).74 Second, the algorithm develops complex internal rules
based on nonlinear processes.75 Such rules may have nothing to do with our
usual ways of recognizing ducks (e.g., by beak, feathers, and feet). Rather,
they may seize upon perceptions unavailable to humans (such as a precise
distance between eyes, a pattern of foot webbing unnoticeable by the human
eye, or some combination of hundreds of other measurements that might
never come to mind to a person).76 Third, the algorithm tests those rules on
a test set (i.e., which of these are ducks?).77 Fourth, the algorithm adjusts its
internal rules based on the success of the test.78 These steps are repeated ad
infinitum until the algorithm can accurately and consistently classify the
images.79
“[B]y exposing so-called ‘machine learning’ algorithms to examples of the
cases of interest . . . the algorithm ‘learns’ which related attributes or
activities can serve as potential proxies for those qualities or outcomes of
interest.”80 Machine learning enables algorithms that analyze data to
“become more accurate over time when completing a task.”81 Thus machine
68. Rich, supra note 36, at 882.
69. Id.
70. Id. (“[T]o restrict which rules the algorithm will use to ensure predictions are made
only on the basis of statistically significant correlations, programmers often require rules to
meet a minimum support level.”).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 882–83.
77. Id. at 882.
78. Id.
79. Id. Recently, the repetition of testing has led to environmental concerns. One study
estimates that training one machine learning model uses more carbon than five cars (including
the carbon footprint of their manufacture). Karen Hao, Training a Single AI Model Can Emit
as Much Carbon as Five Cars in Their Lifetimes, MIT TECH. REV. (June 6, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613630/training-a-single-ai-model-can-emit-as-muchcarbon-as-five-cars-in-their-lifetimes/ [https://perma.cc/7G4D-WHGY].
80. Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 678 (2016).
81. Rich, supra note 36, at 880.
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learning methods are becoming more pervasive throughout society in
situations where optimal outcomes can be quantified or otherwise
evaluatively ranked. Such methods are used in a variety of classification
tasks from identifying spam emails to diagnosing diseases.82 But as they
spread from evaluating tumors83 to evaluating persons, far greater ethical
concerns arise.
B. Bias and Discrimination Concerns in Finance and AI
As the previous section explains, in theory, facially neutral algorithms
mitigate the risk that consumers will face intentional discriminatory
treatment based on legally protected traits such as race, gender, or religion
that commonly characterize face-to-face decisions in financial services.84
Evidence demonstrates that incomplete or inaccurate data sets may influence
the objectivity of learning algorithms.85 Even more alarming, learning
algorithms may easily identify the most expedient path or ideal variable for
solving a problem and making a decision, even if it entirely misses the point
of the training.86 This approach may result in the learning algorithm
independently identifying a facially neutral attribute in data sets that serves
as a proxy for a legally protected trait and executing discriminatory results—
even if developers expressly programmed the algorithm not to discriminate
on the basis of the same protected trait.87
Data mining systems across the board are capable of reproducing the
biases created by human decisions.88 This occurs because the data inputted
into the computer has been simplified to teach the computer to learn by
example, oftentimes a flawed example.89 Developers have created predictive
algorithms that mine personal information to make guesses about
individuals’ likely actions and risks.90 “[M]any credit-scoring mechanisms
include factors that do not just assess the risk characteristics of the borrower;
they also reflect the riskiness of the environment in which a consumer is
utilizing credit, as well as the riskiness of the types of products a consumer
uses.”91

82. Id. at 882.
83. Martin Stumpe & Craig Mermel, Applying Deep Learning to Metastatic Breast
Cancer Detection, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Oct. 12, 2018), http://ai.googleblog.com/2018/10/
applying-deep-learning-to-metastatic.html [https://perma.cc/WL5Z-44YA].
84. Rich, supra note 36, at 883–85.
85. Id.
86. Tom Simonite, When Bots Teach Themselves to Cheat, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2018, 9:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/when-bots-teach-themselves-to-cheat/ [https://perma.cc/
J36T-BFLS].
87. Pauline Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857,
898–99 (2017).
88. See Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109,
115 (2017).
89. Id. at 127–28.
90. Kim, supra note 87, at 860, 875, 885.
91. Lisa Rice & Deidre Swesnik, Discriminatory Effects of Credit Scoring on
Communities of Color, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 936 (2013).
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A robust literature describes a variety of predatory tactics that creditors
have employed to target vulnerable borrowers.92 Credit intermediaries
extend credit to borrowers with limited or impaired credit histories but often
demand higher, arguably exorbitant, interest rates from these borrowers.93
Notwithstanding their awareness of the exploitive and abusive credit terms,94
vulnerable borrowers may conclude that they have few, if any, other
options.95
Historically, consumer lending firms and credit card companies engaged
in aggressive advertising and solicitation practices, such as bait-and-switch
or offers of teaser low interest rates.96 Annually, creditors swarm students
on university campuses, creating a carnival-like atmosphere of blaring music
and freebies and inviting the students to enjoy cheap, easy credit.97
Advanced machine learning and AI will enhance the ability of creditors,
payday lenders, and other predatory market participants to target vulnerable
consumers, exacerbating extant problems.98
An increasing number of commentators express concern that failing to
address bias may weaponize ADM platforms.99 Recently, for example,
92. Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit Card Problem, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 154 (2013); see also Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s
Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 407, 478 (2009) (“[C]redit card
companies have targeted the poor ‘as a source of major profits . . . .’” (quoting Kristin
Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well Being of Women: How
Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1181, 1216 (2006))). For
discussions on payday lending, see Baradaran, supra note 26. See also Deyanira Del Rio &
Andy Morrison, Opinion, Here’s What Happens When Payday Loans Are Banned, WASH.
POST (July 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/07/05/hereswhat-happens-when-payday-loans-are-banned/ [https://perma.cc/T69K-CZB4]; S. 1642 &
H.R. 3299: Madden Bill Could Open the Floodgates to Predatory Lenders, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING (2017), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/
files/research-publication/crl-cleveland-fed-report-madden-nov2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VE9P-5UDZ];.
93. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002); Freeman, supra note
92, at 186–87.
94. See Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted
Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211,
222 (2003).
95. Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position,
40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 593–94 (2009).
96. Engel & McCoy, supra note 93, at 1261.
97. See Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card
Solicitations on College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 192 (2005). Unlike
federal loans, such credit offers are not subject to income-based repayment options. See Frank
Pasquale, Democratizing Higher Education: Defending and Extending Income-Based
Repayment Programs, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 5 (2015).
98. UPTURN, LED ASTRAY: ONLINE LEAD GENERATION AND PAYDAY LOANS 1–2 (2015),
https://www.upturn.org/reports/2015/led-astray/ [https://perma.cc/5MBQ-264E]; Edmund
Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Selling Consumers, Not Lists: The New World of Digital
Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV. 845,
847–48, 867–68, 877 (2014).
99. See, e.g., Noreen Malone, The Algorithm Knows Me. So Why Does It Keep Shaming
Me?, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/algorithm-shamethe-feeling-of-being-seen-by-the-algorithm.html [https://perma.cc/TU78-3LDK].
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social media erupted with outrage after journalists discovered Amazon’s
“Prime-lining”100—a pattern of denying some of its services to
disadvantaged neighborhoods, eerily reminiscent of historical redlining.101
Social media posts revealed that Amazon concentrated its Prime delivery
service in predominantly white neighborhoods.102 These concerns about
what Roberto Unger has called “the most advanced modes of production”
should apply a fortiori in financial contexts, given the power of such firms.103
As sophisticated learning algorithms continue to evolve, the established
dynamic and comprehensive accountability standards that address consumer
protection and bias will prove challenging. Recently adopted federal banking
regulations embrace a deregulatory approach that may encourage innovation
but leave the most marginalized individuals and families deeply vulnerable
to exploitation and discrimination as fintech firms dominate the financial
markets. The next Part explores this deregulatory trend.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND FINTECH
On July 31, 2018, the OCC announced its decision to resolve the
regulatory uncertainties regarding the application of banking regulations to
fintech firms and to permit these newly minted nondepository entities to
apply for national bank charters in the Fintech Charter Decision.104 The
OCC’s action spurred federal court claims seeking a declaratory judgment
that the federal agency had exceeded its authority under its enabling statute
by issuing charters to nondepository fintech firms and soliciting a permanent
injunction to prevent the OCC from chartering fintech firms.
This Part evaluates the OCC’s rationale for adopting the Fintech Charter
Decision. Exploring the claims by state banking supervisors reveals the
necessity of state and federal oversight for fintech firms operating as, for
example, money transmitters or consumer credit platforms. This Part
concludes that preempting state oversight leaves low-income and
100. Careful evaluation of Amazon Prime’s free same-day delivery service recently
revealed the exclusion of “predominantly black ZIP codes.” David Ingold & Spencer Soper,
Amazon Doesn’t Consider the Race of Its Customers. Should It?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2016,
4:50 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-amazon-same-day/ [https://perma.cc/
7N9S-57FL]; see also Rafi Letzter, Amazon Just Showed Us That “Unbiased’ Algorithms Can
Be Inadvertently Racist, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/howalgorithms-can-be-racist-2016-4 [http://perma.cc/MWP5-ZYFS].
101. See Douglas S. Massey, Origins of Economic Disparities: The Historical Role of
Housing Segregation, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 21, at
39, 69 (describing “redlining” as a systematic practice of using discriminatory risk-rating
residential maps for credit and insurance underwriting policies). The maps characterized
predominantly African American neighborhoods as undesirable, which led residents to face
stricter underwriting guidelines or reduced access to higher quality credit and insurance
products. Id.
102. Ingold & Soper, supra note 100.
103. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 3 (2019).
104. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting
National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html
[https://perma.cc/94WZ-TBNC].
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underresourced communities vulnerable to historic predatory and
discriminatory tactics disguised by high-tech innovation.105
A. The Fintech Charter Decision and Federal Preemption
Fintech firms typically adopt one of two approaches: (1) a digital-only
services platform that provides financial services directly to consumers106 or
(2) a partnering platform that operates as an intermediary.107 The latter
category of fintech firms interpose themselves between consumers and
regulated (bank and nonbank) financial institutions. Fintech firms acting as
intermediaries may enter into exclusive partnership arrangements, leveraging
the fintech firm’s integration of learning algorithms and the regulated
financial institution’s established reputation, relationships, and expertise.
Perhaps most importantly, platforms partnering with regulated financial
institutions attain the privileges and benefits from their affiliation with
federally chartered banking institutions.
In accord with the distinct design of our nation’s “dual banking system,”
both federal and state regulators have the power to issue bank charters.108
Banks that receive state charters are subject to the day-to-day supervision of
state banking regulators109 but cannot evade federal regulation. Federal
regulators supervise federally chartered banks and, to mitigate the challenges
of complying with dual—and, at times, incongruent—regulatory obligations,
federally chartered banks need only comply with limited state regulatory
mandates.110
The National Bank Act (NBA) authorizes the OCC to issue federal bank
charters to qualifying financial institutions.111 The statutory language of the
NBA grants the OCC broad authority to introduce regulations associated with
105. See generally Americans for Financial Reform, Comment Letter on Exploring Special
Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/
topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-americans-for-financial-reform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86A4-7M52] (explaining a broad array of legal and policy issues that could
arise and “urging the OCC to refrain from issuing charters to nondepository fintech lenders”).
106. Rocket Mortgage is an end-to-end, online mortgage lending platform operated by
Quicken Loans, a nonbank mortgage originator. See ROCKET MORTGAGE BY QUICKEN LOANS,
https://www.rocketmortgage.com/ [https://perma.cc/RY54-LP98] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
107. GreenSky is a consumer credit platform that pairs consumers seeking to purchase
retail goods or certain services with credit and financial institutions licensed to originate and
distribute consumer loans. See GREENSKY, https://www.greensky.com [https://perma.cc/
U93E-8VLG] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
108. See generally COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL
BANKING
SYSTEM
(2003),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/
publications/banker-education/files/pub-national-banks-and-the-dual-banking-system.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CT4Z-TFB3].
109. Id. at 1.
110. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 535–36 (2009) (holding that states
cannot informally subpoena national banks in their “capacity as supervisor[s] of
corporations”).
111. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 26–27 (2012). The collective versions, amendments, and
regulations commonly referred to as the “National Bank Act” originated with the National
Bank Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. This Essay describes the collection of versions,
amendments, and regulations as the “National Bank Act.”
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issuing charters112 and to determine licensing criteria.113 In 2003, the OCC
amended the regulations governing its authority to issue charters (“2003
Amendments”), creating a path for the agency to issue special purpose
national bank (SPNB) charters to nondepository firms.114 To receive an
SPNB charter, however, an entity must be engaged in the “business of
banking,” meaning the firm conducts at least one of the following core
banking functions: receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money.115
For a decade following the 2003 Amendments, the OCC’s newly
promulgated authority lay dormant. In 2016, the OCC published a white
paper exploring the regulatory impact of emerging fintech firms.116 And in
December 2016,117 at an event at the Georgetown University Law Center,
then-Comptroller Thomas Curry announced the OCC’s decision to “move

112. 12 U.S.C. § 26.
113. Id. The NBA grants the OCC authority to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out
its responsibilities associated with issuing charters. Id. Under the NBA, “upon careful
examination of the facts,” the comptroller of the currency will determine if an applicant for a
national banking charter “is lawfully entitled to commence the business of banking” and issue
“a certificate” indicating that the business has complied with the standards required for firms
engaged in the business of banking. Id. § 27.
114. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1) (2019).
115. Id. Under the “bank powers clause” in section 24 of the NBA, the OCC has the
authority to charter national banking associations by granting them “all such incidental powers
as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking” and then listing five express powers.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012). The express powers of national banks under section 24 include: (1)
discounting and negotiating notes; (2) receiving deposits; (3) trading currency; (4) making
loans on personal security; and (5) circulating notes. Id. The terms “incidental powers” and
the “business of banking” are not expressly defined in the NBA but include activities
authorized at the discretion of the comptroller, within reasonable bounds. See id. §§ 21, 24,
26–27.
116. OCC, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN
OCC PERSPECTIVE (2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/
banker-education/files/pub-responsible-innovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CQD-QWYZ]. The OCC published supplements to the white paper,
requests for comments, and additional white papers following the March 2016 white paper.
See OCC, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES
(2016),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/pub-specialpurpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MVX9-ZXJM]
[hereinafter
EXPLORING SPNBS]; OCC, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING A
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsibleinnovation/comments/recommendations-decisions-for-implementing-a-responsibleinnovation-framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T8U-C5KU] [hereinafter EXPLAINING SPNB
CHARTERS]; Public Comments on Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for
Fintech Companies, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://web.archive.org/web/
20190221152812/https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/fintech-chartercomments.html [https://perma.cc/8FJQ-L48K]. The OCC published a draft supplement to the
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual signaling that the agency planned to permit fintech firms that
do not receive deposits (nondepository entities) to apply for SPNB charters. See OCC,
EVALUATING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (2017),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/file-pub-lmfintech-licensing-manual-supplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6PW-SSFN]; Press Release,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 104.
117. See generally EXPLORING SPNBS, supra note 116.
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forward with chartering financial technology companies that offer bank
products and services.”118
As a result of the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision, each class of fintech
firms (digital-only platforms or partnering platforms) may apply for an SPNB
charter.119 While subject to federal regulatory oversight, fintech firms that
receive an SPNB charter may be exempt from state regulations that the OCC
concludes prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of banking
powers authorized under federal law.120
According to the OCC, enabling fintech firms to apply for SPNB charters
levels the playing field between fintech firms and conventional depository
banks, promotes uniform eligibility criteria, and ensures consistency in the
development and enforcement of legal standards across the increasingly
diverse body of entities providing financial services.121 The OCC also boasts
that the breadth and depth of federal expertise in banking and risk
management oversight, the benefits of federal insurance on deposits and
national banks’ safety and soundness (e.g., “contingency” plan
development), and ethical obligations (to increase inclusion and fair access
to financial markets) leave little room to challenge the OCC’s decision to
preempt state financial services regulators’ supervision of fintech firms.
Proponents argue that the absence of federal oversight will spur a race to the
bottom, as states compete to attract fintech firms to their jurisdiction. This
account is, however, misleading.
The arguments articulated in support of granting the OCC exclusive
jurisdiction over fintech firms are weak, inaccurate, and, in some instances,
simply wrong. Even assuming all of the economic arguments supporting
federal regulation are persuasive, there are important normative reasons to
reject OCC oversight of fintech firms. The OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision
may have detrimental implications for lower-income consumers that will rely
on nondeposit banking entities for credit and financial services.
To that end, state regulators and consumer protection advocates have
raised alarms. The New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS)
and the national Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) each initiated
federal lawsuits seeking to enjoin the OCC from issuing charters on the
grounds that issuing SPNB charters to nondepository entities exceeded the
agency’s authority under the NBA.122
In their initial complaints, state regulators challenged the OCC’s decision
to preempt state authority as “lawless, ill-conceived, and destabilizing of
118. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at the Georgetown
University Law Center Regarding Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech
Companies (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pubspeech-2016-152.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9XJ-R6HW].
119. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 104.
120. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(1)(B) (2012).
121. EXPLORING SPNBS, supra note 116, at 2.
122. See generally Vullo v. OCC, No. 17 Civ. 3574 (NRB), 2017 WL 6512245 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2017) (DFS); Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285
(D.D.C. 2018) (CSBS).
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financial markets that are properly and most effectively regulated” by
states.123 The DFS condemned the OCC policy for “put[ting] New York
financial consumers—and often the most vulnerable ones—at great risk of
exploitation by federally chartered entities improperly insulated from New
York law.”124
Because the OCC had not yet implemented a rule permitting fintech firms
to apply for SPNB charters, the federal district courts concluded that the
initial federal claims by the DFS and CSBS challenging the Fintech Charter
Decision were not ripe for review.125 Following the OCC’s formal
announcement of the Fintech Charter Decision, the DFS reintroduced the
claim for declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the OCC from
granting fintech firms charters.126 Setting aside the procedural issues and
jurisdictional and constitutional claims raised by the DFS and CSBS, there
are several fundamental weaknesses in the OCC’s rationale for preempting
state regulatory oversight.
First, the DFS and CSBS argued that the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision
and the adoption of the 2003 Amendments exceeded the OCC’s authority
under the NBA.127 Critically, the DFS and CSBS questioned the OCC’s
authority to declare that nondepository firms are engaged in the “business of
banking”;128 the DFS and CSBS argued that Congress and state legislators
carefully labored for more than a century to create a delicate balance between
federal and state regulators’ oversight of entities that are “banks” and
nonbank financial institutions.129 The OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision
“upsets the balance” between state and federal regulators and “extends
federal banking law’s blanket preemption to numerous areas currently
subject to [state] laws and supervision.”130
As noted in the previous section, entities engaged in the “business of
banking” perform one of three core functions: receiving deposits, paying
123. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Vullo, No. 17 Civ. 3574 (NRB)
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Vullo Complaint]. The DFS claimed that
issuing SPNB charters to nondepository institutions exceeds the OCC’s authority under the
NBA and unjustly defies the DFS’s regulatory authority over these institutions. Id. However,
the OCC’s motions to dismiss these two complaints were granted. Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 302; Vullo, 2017 WL 6512245, at *10.
124. Vullo Complaint, supra note 123, at 1–2.
125. See, e.g., Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 299–301; Vullo,
2017 WL 6512245, at *9–10.
126. Vullo v. OCC, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). The court denied the
OCC’s motion to dismiss the state agency’s claims that the OCC exceeded its authority under
the NBA by permitting fintech firms that are nondepository entities to apply for SPNB
charters. Id. at 278.
127. The DFS also claimed that the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision violated the Tenth
Amendment. Id. at 299. The federal district court did, however, dismiss the DFS’s claims
alleging that the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision violated the Tenth Amendment. Id.
128. According to the NBA’s original language, entities applying for SPNB charters must
conduct activities that constitute the “business of banking.” 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2019).
129. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232, 356 (2004).
130. Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 286.
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checks, or lending money.131 The OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision is the
first attempt in the agency’s 140-year history to regulate nondepository
institutions as “banks.”132
Once the OCC formally adopted the Fintech Charter Decision and the DFS
resubmitted its claims, the Southern District of New York denied, in part, the
OCC’s motion to dismiss the DFS claims and concluded that “[a] key feature
of the dual banking system is that, with certain exceptions, any entity that is
not a deposit-receiving bank—including non-depository fintech
companies—is left largely to the prerogative of the states to regulate.”133 The
DFS’s claims poignantly articulated the primacy of a state’s regulatory
authority over nondepository fintech firms and condemned the OCC’s
blanket preemption as upsetting the balance of the dual banking system. As
the court explained, the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision directly encroaches
upon the sovereign interests of the state of New York.134
B. Automating Predatory Inclusion
The Fintech Charter Decision presumably permits nondepository fintech
firms operating as money transmitters and payday lenders to apply for SPNB
charters. As nonbank entities, money transmitters and payday lenders have
traditionally been subject to state but not federal regulation. As the DFS
complaint noted, because of the disproportionate number of vulnerable
consumers who rely on these types of entities, the shift in regulatory
oversight is, simply stated, “troubling.”135 The explosive growth of fintech
firms using ADM platforms to solicit vulnerable consumers at a
unprecedented volume and velocity in financial services areas such as money
transmission, mortgage lending, unsecured consumer lending, and debt
collection demands careful oversight.
The OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision compromises states’ regulatory and
enforcement authority over fintech firms with SPNB charters acting as
money transmitters and payday lenders, which enables these entities to evade
state interest rate caps and usury laws. These businesses may “trap
consumers in a cycle of high-interest borrowing that they can never repay,
leading to the sort of economic and social devastation like that seen in the
recent foreclosure crisis.”136
As 270 entities—community, labor, civil rights, faith-based, and military
and veterans groups—observed earlier this year, “over 90 million Americans

131. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i).
132. Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 296.
133. Id.; see also Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 974
F. Supp. 2d 353, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 769 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing New
York State’s primacy in regulating payday loans when no conflicting federal law exists).
134. Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 286–87 (explaining that “[t]he threats to New York’s
sovereignty are so clear that OCC does not even mention, let alone contest, the state’s
interests”).
135. Vullo Complaint, supra note 123, at 15.
136. Id.
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live in jurisdictions where payday lending is illegal.”137 These state
consumer protection laws help consumers “save billions of dollars each year
in predatory payday loan fees that trap people in long-term, devastating
cycles of debt.”138
Second, the Fintech Charter Decision creates risk management concerns
that erode consumer protections related to uninsured losses. Safeguards
governing state and federal depository institutions protect consumers from
risks of loss related to liquidity and solvency crises. Fintech firms holding
nondepository SPNB charters will presumably not be subject to the
supervision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.139 As a
consequence of the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision, these firms may also
be free from state bonding requirements, liquidity, and capitalization
standards.140
Third, the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision deprives state regulators of
registration and licensing fees that fund consumer protection and
antidiscrimination enforcement actions.141 The operating expenses of DFS
and other state financial services regulators “are funded by assessments
levied by the agency upon New York State licensed financial institutions.”142
The authority to issue charters enables state banking regulators to oversee the
operational activities of these types of businesses and funds and the collection
of charter fees funds states’ enforcement of consumer protection and
antidiscrimination laws.
Notwithstanding the OCC’s claims, early evidence suggests that the
agency does not have a well-established method to ensure any of the
proposed regulatory benefits. According to Kenneth Thomas, the OCC is
137. See Payday Lending-Free States Cry Foul over OCC “Fintech” Charter, NEW ECON.
PROJECT (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.neweconomynyc.org/2017/01/payday-lending-freestates-cry-foul-occ-fintech-charter/ [https://perma.cc/7ERZ-BE3Y]; see also New Economy
Project, Comment Letter on Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech
Companies (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/
comment-new-economy-project-fintech-charters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WZG-WA35]
(comment letter from over 200 consumer, civil rights, and community groups opposing the
proposed OCC nonbank lending charters and stating that “[s]tate laws often operate as the
primary line of defense for consumers and small businesses” and that they “have also seen
costly payday lenders hide behind the costume of ‘fintech’”); Delvin Davis & Susan Lupton,
States Without Payday and Car-Title Lending Save over $5 Billion in Fees Annually, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Jan. 2017), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/
nodes/files/research-publication/crl_payday_fee_savings_jun2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
GM57-7DL8].
138. Payday Lending-Free States Cry Foul over OCC “Fintech” Charter, supra note 137;
see Davis & Lupton, supra note 137.
139. Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 296 (“First, the Federal Reserve Act requires national banks
to obtain membership in the Federal Reserve System and insurance under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDIA). But a national bank must be ‘engaged in the business of receiving
deposits’ to obtain insurance under the FDIA. Chartering national banks that do not receive
deposits—which are ineligible for insurance under the FDIA and therefore unable to join the
Federal Reserve System—would introduce an anomaly into this scheme.” (citations omitted)
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1) (2012))).
140. Id. at 279–80.
141. See Vullo Complaint, supra note 123, at 14–17.
142. Id. at 17.
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unlikely to apply the rigorous standards of inclusion set out in existing
legislation such as the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).143 To appease
fintech firms, Thomas argues, the OCC likely will engage in a policy that is
at best “CRA-lite” and at worst “an outright CRA exemption.”144 If the OCC
genuinely enforces obligations subjecting fintech firms to examinations,
public evaluations, ratings, and community input consistent with the
traditional understandings of notions of greater inclusion, fintech firms likely
will balk and shy away from federal charters.
These are not mere hypothetical concerns; as the New Economy Project
has documented, online lenders “have been subject to a long list of state and
federal enforcement actions, settlement agreements, and investigations.”145
Moreover, they may lure unsuspecting borrowers away from much more
sustainable alternatives, including publicly vetted options.146
Federal preemption severely restricts state financial services regulators’
oversight. While our nation’s dual banking system permits financial
institutions to apply for either state or federal charters, electing to apply for
a federal charter enables a bank to escape certain day-to-day regulations
imposed by state banking authorities; national banks are exempt from state
rules addressing licensing, enforcement, and interest rates. States cannot
adopt or enforce laws that prevent or significantly interfere with the national
banks’ ability to exercise powers granted by federal charters.147

143. Kenneth H. Thomas, Why Fintechs Should Be Held to CRA Standards, AM. BANKER
(Aug. 24, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-fintechs-shouldbe-held-to-cra-standards [https://perma.cc/9Q4N-8WG9].
144. Id.
145. Practices of the Online Lending Industry: Hearing Before the S. Standing Comm. on
Banks, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (N.Y. 2017) (statement of Raúl Carrillo, New Economy
Project), http://www.neweconomynyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Testimony-re-online
-lending-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4D2-X8FA]. For more on New York concerns, see Daniel
S. Alter, The “Business of Banking” in New York—An Historical Impediment to the OCC’s
Proposed National “Fintech Charter,” YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 29, 2017),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-business-of-banking-in-new-york-an-historical-impediment-tothe-occs-proposed-national-fintech-charter-by-daniel-s-alter/
[https://perma.cc/BT9NHTYV].
146. David Lazarus, Pricey ‘Fintech’ Lenders Put the Squeeze on Cash-Strapped Small
Businesses, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-small-business-loans-20170616-story.html
[https://perma.cc/MW94VA9H] (reporting that “Bill Manger, associate administrator for the federal Small Business
Administration’s Office of Capital Access, advised starting the hunt for capital not with a
fintech firm but with the agency’s LINC search tool (that’s LINC as in Leveraging Information
and Networks to access Capital)” in response to Lazarus’s story of a small business owner
charging amounts that “translated to an annual percentage rate of 55%” by a fintech firm).
147. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)
§ 1044(a), 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) (2012). In 2007, prior to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the OCC’s preemptive authority over licensing and
supervisory enforcement. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A., 550 U.S. 1, 7, 21 (2007).
Two years later, in 2009, the Court concluded that the OCC did not have the exclusive right
to enforce nonpreempted state laws against national banks. See Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 529 (2009) (preserving the power of state attorneys general to enforce
valid state laws against national banks). The Dodd-Frank Act clarified the legal standard for
preemption and established that the NBA may preempt state consumer financial law only if:
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Consequently, many of the benefits touted by proponents of the Fintech
Charter Decision may well be illusory.
The Fintech Charter Decision is a recent example of a series of aggressive
preemptive actions by the OCC to expand the agency’s scope of authority
and federally chartered banks’ permitted activities.148 Consider, for example
the OCC’s decision to permit federally chartered banks to engage in overthe-counter credit derivatives transactions. Beginning in the late 1980s and
ending in 2008, shortly before the onset of the recent financial crisis, the OCC
issued a series of interpretive letters asserting its regulatory authority over
this innovative, emerging class of financial assets.149
Scholars and commentators have sharply criticized the OCC’s
“excessively broad” interpretation of the meaning of the statutory language
that establishes the ambit of its regulatory mandate.150 As described above,
the NBA authorizes the OCC to determine the scope of permissible activities
for federally chartered banks engaged in the “business of banking.”
Although the safety and soundness of financial markets should serve as a
guiding principle for the “business of banking,” few have questioned the
agency’s authority to define the scope of federally chartered banks’ permitted
activities.151
Emboldened by its unchecked authority, the OCC utilized the interpretive
letter campaign during the period leading up to the recent financial crisis to
permit banks to engage in options, futures, forward contracts, and swap
arrangements that exposed the banks to catastrophic losses. Curiously, the
OCC and other senior banking regulators justified their decision by

(A) application of a State consumer financial law would have a discriminatory
effect on national banks, in comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered
by that State;
(B) in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v.
Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517 U.S. 25 (1996), the State
consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the
national bank of its powers; and any preemption determination under this
subparagraph may be made by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller
of the Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with applicable law; or
(C) the State consumer financial law is preempted by a provision of Federal law
other than title 62 of the Revised Statutes.
Dodd-Frank § 1044(a).
148. See, e.g., EUGENE N. WHITE, THE COMPTROLLER AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN BANKING, 1960–1990 (1992) (outlining the OCC’s increasingly aggressive
interpretations of permissible activities during the last four decades).
149. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
“Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1055–77 (2019).
150. See, e.g., id. at 1041, 1100–06.
151. See id. at 1055 n.64 (“[T]he issue of what constitutes the ‘business of banking’ seems
to have completely dropped off legal scholars’ radars shortly after [NationsBank of N.C.,
N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)] was decided. Since the mid1990s, there has been no serious academic analysis of the evolution and scope of this
fundamental concept in banking law. Partly, this loss of interest may be a result of the OCC’s
successful campaign to assert its broad view as the dominant theory blessed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.”).
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promoting the notion that derivatives would enable the banks to better
manage risks. According to the OCC:
[B]anks may use these [derivatives] contracts to manage certain risks
resulting from their expressly permitted banking activities. In these areas,
the use of options is connected to the underlying banking activities, such as
managing risks in the bank’s investment portfolio and dealer-bank
activities, and managing interest rate risks associated with asset/liability
management.152

In the wake of the financial crisis, the largest financial institutions and
thousands of surviving small- and medium-sized banks solicited federal aid.
Markets endured a near-decade of tumult and employment opportunities,
savings, and access to credit markets disappeared for millions of lowerincome families. As Saule T. Omarova explains, the impact of the tools in
the OCC’s “arsenal of statutory interpretation cannot be underestimated.”153
The Fintech Charter Decision replicates the agency’s erroneous and deeply
problematic approach to navigating agency action.
III. COLLABORATING TO ADDRESS BIAS AND PROTECT CONSUMERS
In the run-up to the financial crisis, federal authorities preempted state law
meant to protect consumers.154 The stated aim was to ensure financial
inclusion and innovation, but the unintended consequences were disastrous.
Federal authorities were not adequately staffed to monitor, let alone deter or
punish, widespread fraudulent practices.155 Agencies like the OCC have also
flattened diverse state policies into a one-size-fits-all, cookie-cutter
approach.156 We all know the results.157 It now appears that the OCC may
be repeating its past mistakes.

152. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 260, 1983 WL 54147 (June 27, 1983).
153. Omarova, supra note 149, at 1059.
154. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES 112 (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH6D-DDCV] (“Once OCC and OTS preemption was in place,
the two federal agencies were the only regulators with the power to prohibit abusive lending
practices by national banks and thrifts and their direct subsidiaries.”); id. at 350 (“The Office
of Thrift Supervision has acknowledged failures in its oversight of AIG. . . . John Reich, a
former OTS director, told the FCIC that as late as September 2008, he had ‘no clue—no idea—
what [AIG’s] CDS liability was.’” (alteration in original)).
155. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 177 (2015) (describing resource constraints).
156. LINDA E. FISHER & JUDITH FOX, THE FORECLOSURE ECHO: HOW THE HARDEST HIT
HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY 123 (2019).
157. Fortunately, the Supreme Court quickly signaled after the crisis that its propreemption approach here had gone too far. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v.
Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers
a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, in THE PANIC OF
2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 295 (Lawrence E. Mitchell &
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010).
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As Part I explained, expanding access to credit may attract predatory
lenders and unsavory lending practices.158 The OCC’s Fintech Charter
Decision described in Part II may undermine state regulators’ efforts to
enforce the full range of consumer protection and antidiscrimination
statutes.159
This Part surveys the most commonly proposed solutions and argues that
the evolving and complex nature of learning algorithms requires state and
federal regulators to collaborate to ensure the efficacy of critical consumer
protection and antidiscrimination measures. We argue that regulators must
consider limiting the use of algorithms in consumer credit markets. While
the extant literature has generally focused on “fixing” black box AI in
finance, this Essay argues that regulators should evaluate the use of machine
learning algorithms and establish a formal rule that limits or, in some
instances, strictly bans the use of algorithms.
A. Transparency, Explainability, Auditing, and Beyond
Over the last several years, scholars and data scientists have crafted a
careful and detailed portrait of the potential for big data analytics to lead to
biased, unfair, or prejudicial outcomes.160 Deconstructing the technical
aspects of ADM, scholars have identified several stages in the development
process of ADM platforms where programmers may unintentionally
incorporate bias: inputs, training, and programming.
Fintech firms employing ADM platforms increasingly describe
creditworthiness decisions as a form of behavioral analysis or behavioral
scoring.161 Lenders have increased their use of big-data profiling techniques,
using complex algorithms to detect patterns about consumers’ daily lives and
as a means for predicting consumer behavior.162 Everything from internet
searches or shopping patterns to social media activity has suddenly become
relevant and may be used to “score” individual consumers.163 A careful
examination reveals evidence that new approaches may lead to bias if not
effectively monitored.164
A 2004 study by the National Association of State Public Interest Research
Groups found that 79 percent of credit reports contained errors.165 Twentyfive percent of credit reports contained significant errors that would result in
158. See supra Part I.
159. See supra Part II.
160. See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS
OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018).
161. See Nick Szabo, Negative Reputation, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST.,
https://nakamotoinstitute.org/negative-reputation/ [https://perma.cc/U76L-344K] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019).
162. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 63, at 148.
163. Id. at 152.
164. Id. at 155–56.
165. NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE PIRGS, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 4 (2004), https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Mistakes_Do_
Happen_2004_USPIRG.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX8H-UP2Q].

2019]

TOWARD RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION

523

denial of credit.166 Specifically, 54 percent had inaccurate personal
information, 30 percent listed closed accounts as open, and 8 percent did not
list major credit accounts.167
Building these errors into the digital economy will amplify inaccuracy and
entrench errors into automated systems that are faster, more ubiquitous, and
nearly impossible to correct. Accurately identifying sources of bias in credit
decisions may be as critical to risk management oversight as predicting
default and prepayment risks.
To address concerns regarding bias, scholars, commentators, and
regulators propose a number of solutions designed to engender algorithmic
accountability that are focused on the problems of commensurability and
accountability generated by quantitative and algorithmic analysis.168 To
better pursue those critiques, we must demand more explainability from AI
models and applications. Explainable AI is interpretable and enables a
degree of qualitative functional understanding.169 Explainable AI examines
the reasons that an algorithm makes a specific decision to enable humans to
interpret the decision-making process.170 There are a few reasons why
explainability could help resolve the issue of biases; below, trust, greater
visibility of flaws in an algorithm, and enhanced performance and control are
discussed.
Explainability can build trust between the algorithm and the user trying to
understand it. Trust can be viewed in two different ways.171 First, there is
trust in the sense of trusting a prediction sufficiently to act on it.172 Second,
there is trust in regard to trusting a model.173 This equates to “whether the
user trusts a model to behave in reasonable ways if deployed.”174 Both of
these “are directly impacted by how much the human understands a model’s
behaviour, as opposed to seeing it as a black box.”175 Determining trust in
an individual prediction is incredibly important.176 When AI makes a
prediction, that prediction “cannot be acted upon [in] blind faith” because the
results could be devastating.177 A model as a whole needs to be trusted

166. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 63, at 155–56.
167. NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE PIRGS, supra note 165, at 4.
168. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing for transparency).
169. PWC, EXPLAINABLE AI:
DRIVING BUSINESS VALUE THROUGH GREATER
UNDERSTANDING (2019), https://www.pwc.co.uk/audit-assurance/assets/explainable-ai.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BRP8-N932].
170. See generally Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh & Carlos Guestrin, “Why Should I
Trust You?”: Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, 22 PROC. ACM SIGKDD INT’L
CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 1135 (2016).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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before it is deployed.178 “[U]sers need to be confident that the model will
perform well on real-world data . . . .”179
Second, when firms use an explainable AI system, that system provides
greater visibility over unknown flaws and can provide assurance that the
system is operating as expected.180 This understanding “provides insights
into the model, which can be used to transform an untrustworthy model or
prediction into a trustworthy one.”181 For example, the Association for
Computing Machinery asks that “institutions that use algorithmic decisionmaking . . . produce explanations regarding both the procedures followed by
the algorithm and the specific decisions that are made.”182 This principle is
focused around explaining two things to users: the process and the results.183
Third, explainablity can help with performance and control.184 If you can
understand how the model works, you can tweak and optimize the model that
you are using.185 If a model is explainable, “it forces the basis of decisionmaking into the open and thus provides a way to question the validity” of the
decision-making.186 “[E]xperts can [then] assess whether the relationships
uncovered by the model seem appropriate, given their background
knowledge of the phenomenon being modeled.”187 Detecting biases in the
model or data set is easier if you can understand what the model is doing and
why it arrives at its predictions.188
Explainability requirements may not come naturally to experts in AI and
machine learning. However, the requirements are necessary if we are to
apply extant discrimination laws and develop a regulatory system capable of
deterring correlation-driven biases. The need now in finance is not simply
for extant regulatory entities to come in after the damage has been done and
to rectify discriminatory or otherwise problematic behavior. Rather, we are
in need of an industrial policy to steer underwriting technologies towards
forms that are capable of being regulated and reformed.189 Without such
incentives for (and steering of) the development of AI in finance, cherished
values of equal opportunity will be even further marginalized.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING
MACHINERY (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/
2017_usacm_statement_algorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM8N-T2UT].
183. Id.
184. PWC, supra note 169.
185. Id.
186. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines,
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1122 (2018).
187. Id. at 1123.
188. Cf. id.
189. Accord Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2) (promoting
regulation “requiring firms to employ statistical models that isolate only the predictive power
of non-suspect variables”).
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In the debate regarding regulatory preemption, consumer advocates have
warned that the “lack of transparency around the processing of data and
automated algorithms may lead to increasing information asymmetries
between the financial institution and the individual and consumers are thus
left with less awareness and a lack of understanding and control over
important financial decisions.”190 By impeding opportunities for regulators
to promote such transparency, the OCC’s Fintech Charter Decision
exacerbates the challenges of identifying and implementing useful solutions
for accountability, responsibility, and transparency concerns.
B. Coordinated Regulation
Prescribing the proper scope of explainable learning algorithms represents
one of several challenges that regulators will face as technology continues to
evolve. Federal oversight of fintech firms will certainly involve crafting and
adapting dynamic rules. In light of these challenges, even if federal
regulators intend to offer SPNB charters to fintech firms, the power of state
regulators and attorneys general to develop and enforce rules governing the
integration of learning algorithms in consumer finance must be preserved.
The Dodd-Frank Act codified Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v.
Nelson,191 rejecting the OCC’s attempt from two years earlier to assert
preemptive authority over bank licensing and supervisory enforcement.192
Any federal fintech rules should clearly reflect that federally chartered banks
remain subject to the consumer protection, inclusion, and antidiscrimination
laws adopted and enforced by the states in which they operate. As indicated
by the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent conclusion in Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass’n,193 while the OCC is the sole regulator of national banks, federal
preemption does not preempt states from enforcing fair-lending laws.194
To ensure robust and durable consumer protections, state and federal
regulators should collaborate to create a uniform “floor” of standards. State
and federal banking supervisors must agree on which regulator will exercise
primary regulatory authority with respect to that floor. States must be
allowed to innovate as laboratories of democracy to quickly respond to
emerging threats. The OCC does not have the authority under the NBA as
interpreted by the Court in Barnett and Clearing House to preempt state
enforcement of state consumer protection regulations.

190. Center for Digital Democracy & U.S. PIRG, Comment Letter on Exploring Special
Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/
topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-cdd-uspirg.pdf [https://perma.cc/69KFN5KK] (comment letter opposing the proposed OCC nonbank lending charters).
191. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
192. See supra note 147.
193. 557 U.S. 519 (2008).
194. See id. at 524–36.
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Federal regulators may agree to relax standards and weaken enforcement
of disparate impact standards, further exposing consumers to biased
decisions by ADM platforms.195
The exponentially significant number of fintech firms and the speed of
their operations’ ability to target the most vulnerable consumers present
unprecedented concerns in consumer financial services markets. According
to a recent report by the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO):
[I]n 2017, personal loans provided by these lenders totaled about $17.7
billion, up from about $2.5 billion in 2013. In addition, these lenders’ small
business loans and lines of credit grew from about $582 million in 2013 to
$4.2 billion in 2017, and their student loans and student loan refinancing
grew from about $3.4 billion in 2015 to $7.8 billion in 2017.196

Based on the regulatory framework governing financial markets, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) could serve an important role
in establishing the minimum standards applied for integrating ADM
technology and ensuring transparency and explainability, as well as
compliance with consumer protection and antidiscrimination norms.
However, personnel matters just as much as institutional capacity. State
regulators and consumer advocates rightly express concerns that a change in
the CFPB’s priorities and the reorganization of the CFPB over the past few
years may impede rigorous enforcement. Recent scandals at Wells Fargo and
other national banks heighten concerns that national banking regulators may
not rigorously monitor compliance with consumer protections.197
195. On May 21, 2018, then-Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) Mick Mulvaney issued a statement responding to the adoption of a bipartisan
congressional resolution that nullified a 2013 CFPB bulletin that offered guidance regarding
the application of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) to indirect, third-party car loans.
For Mulvaney’s statement, see Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, Statement of
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection on Enactment of S.J. Res. 57 (May 21, 2018),
https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/statement-bureau-consumer-financialprotection-enactment-sj-res-57/ [https://perma.cc/H759-QPKB]. For a description of the
CFPB’s 2013 interpretation of the application of ECOA to disparate impact claims alleging
discriminatory pricing, see Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB to Hold
Auto Lenders Accountable for Illegal Discriminatory Markup (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-to-hold-auto-lenders-accountable-for-illegal-discriminatory-markup/
[https://perma.cc/G87R-4WXE]. See also Lawyer: CFPB on ‘Warpath’ for Auto-Lending
Add-On
Products,
AUTO
FIN.
NEWS
(May
3,
2013,
7:41
PM),
https://www.autofinancenews.net/lawyer-cfpb-on-warpath-for-auto-lending-add-onproducts/ [https://perma.cc/S7ER-E366]; Robin Sidel & Alan Zibel, Regulators Scrutinize
Auto Lenders over Add-Ons, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324582004578459170902840306 [https://perma.cc/RL6G-TU7T].
196. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-111, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY:
AGENCIES SHOULD PROVIDE CLARIFICATION ON LENDERS’ USE OF ALTERNATIVE DATA 10–11
(2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696149.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5N4-DUFM]
(citations omitted).
197. See Bethany McLean, How Wells Fargo’s Cutthroat Corporate Culture Allegedly
Drove Bankers to Fraud, VANITY FAIR (May 31, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/
2017/05/wells-fargo-corporate-culture-fraud [https://perma.cc/7RCS-PUS6]. In 2016, Wells
Fargo announced a settlement agreement with the CFPB, the OCC, and the City and County
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It is likely that many state regulators will have the political will and
flexibility to address some of the dynamic and rapidly evolving challenges
presented by learning algorithms.198 Municipalities and states have
undertaken important attempts to address the challenges created by opaque
algorithms.199 For example, the New York State DFS recently announced
the creation of a Research and Innovation Division to enable the state agency
to adapt consumer protections in an evolving and dynamic market.200 The

of Los Angeles and agreed to pay a combined $185 million. For next two years, Wells Fargo
entered into multiple settlement agreements with several different state and federal regulators
and media accounts revealed widespread misconduct and an unparalleled, multi-faceted fraud
campaign that targeted individual consumers, including active members of the military. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Obtains $5.4 Million in Additional
Relief to Compensate Servicemembers for Unlawful Repossessions by Wells Fargo Dealer
Services (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-obtains-54million-additional-relief-compensate-servicemembers-unlawful
[https://perma.cc/89DTY5CL]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches $4 Million
Settlement with Wells Fargo Dealer Services for Illegally Repossessing Servicemembers’
Cars (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-4-millionsettlement-wells-fargo-dealer-services-illegally
[https://perma.cc/LGL2-UELL];
Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Wells Fargo Bank Agrees to Pay $1.2 Billion for Improper
Mortgage Lending Practices (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wells-fargo-bankagrees-pay-12-billion-improper-mortgage-lending-practices [https://perma.cc/5PQZ-CGUR].
For examples of the diversity of financial services that were subject to prosecution, see Wells
Fargo Brokerage Servs., LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 80,302, 2017 WL 1090873 (Mar.
23, 2017) and Wells Fargo Brokerage Servs., LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 9349, 2012
WL 3308357 (Aug. 14, 2012). See also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Wells
Fargo Advisors Admits Failing to Maintain Controls and Producing Altered Document,
Agrees to Pay $5 Million Penalty (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-207 [https://perma.cc/GF92-Z9VY]. For an example of the settlement
agreements, see Written Agreement Between Wells Fargo & Company and Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, Docket No. 18-007-B-HC (Feb. 2, 2018). See also Press Release, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Responding to Widespread Consumer Abuses and
Compliance Breakdowns by Wells Fargo, Federal Reserve Restricts Wells’ Growth Until Firm
Improves Governance and Controls. Concurrent with Fed Action, Wells to Replace Three
Directors by April, One by Year End (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20180202a.htm
[https://perma.cc/CQP7-CJHG]
[hereinafter Fed. Reserve Wells Fargo Press Release]; Wells Fargo Update: Federal Reserve
Consent Order, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 2, 2018), https://mms.businesswire.com/media/
20180202005711/en/638742/1/3837099cWells_Fargo_Consent_Order_en.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/MD3Q-7SUD].
198. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys
General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2017) (demonstrating that state authorities have an
important role to play in data regulation).
199. See, e.g., LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A ROADMAP FOR
CALIFORNIA (2018),
https://lhc.ca.gov/sites/lhc.ca.gov/files/Reports/245/Report245.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V46H-MAP3]; New York City Automated Decision Task Force, NYC.GOV,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/adstaskforce/index.page [https://perma.cc/UW2Q-BDCF] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“The New York City Automated Decision Systems Task Force (ADS
Task Force) was established by Local Law 49 of 2018 and is tasked with recommending a
process for reviewing the City’s use of automated decision systems (more commonly known
as algorithms).”).
200. Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., DFS Superintendent Linda A. Lacewell
Announces Newly Created Research and Innovation Division, New Executive Appointments
(July 23, 2019), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1907231
[https://perma.cc/7N6F-5ZBS].
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DFS had previously led national and state regulators by introducing a
“BitLicense” and regulating digital currency businesses and intermediaries
that hold custody of digital assets.201
As Danielle Keats Citron observes regarding another data-intensive area
of regulation:
State attorneys general have been nimble privacy enforcement
pioneers, a role that for practical and political reasons would be difficult for
federal agencies to replicate. Because attorneys general do not have to
wrestle with the politics of agency commissioners or deal with layers of
bureaucracy, they can move quickly on privacy and data security initiatives.
Career staff have developed specialties and expertise growing out of a
familiarity with local conditions and constituent concerns. Because
attorneys general are on the front lines, they are often the first to learn about
and respond to privacy and security violations. Because constituents
express concern about privacy and data security, so in turn do state
attorneys general who tend to harbor ambitions for higher office.
This is an auspicious time to study the contributions of state privacy
enforcers. Even as Congress has been mired in gridlock, attorneys general
have helped fill gaps in privacy law through legislation, education, and
enforcement. They have worked with state lawmakers on consumer
privacy issues.202

The same is true of state financial regulators, particularly New York’s
DFS. They are a vital counterbalance to sudden swings in policy priorities
that can occur on the national level.
CONCLUSION
Will fintech firms adopting AI technology successfully expand access to
credit markets and foster the inclusion of unbanked or underbanked
consumers—those consumers with thin or impaired credit files? To be sure,
the advent of AI technology has some potential to improve legacy banking,
catalyze new market infrastructure, and spur development that may benefit
unbanked and underbanked consumers. However, such positive outcomes
are far from likely if regulators are unable to engage in effective supervision
of fintech firms’ algorithms.
Rather than enhance regulatory oversight, the OCC decision to allow
nondepository fintech firms to operate as special purpose nonbank entities
may stymie careful evaluation and supervision of whether fintech firms live
up to their promise. This will leave vulnerable consumers exposed to
perilous predatory behavior. The OCC’s intervention undermines state
regulatory authorities’ efforts to monitor consumer lending markets, impose
long-standing consumer protections, and enforce measures designed to
mitigate predatory inclusion against fintech firms.
201. See Virtual Currency Business Activity (BitLicense), N.Y. ST. DEP’T FIN. SERVICES,
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/virtual_currency_businesses [https://perma.cc/
CWY6-W98J] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
202. Citron, supra note 198, at 750.
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The United States needs to ensure thoughtful collaboration among state
and federal regulators to proactively address any structural changes in the
market for banking charters and careful consideration of the best approach to
achieve early and widely endorsed interventions that promote the
accountability, transparency, and explainability of their algorithmic
processing of consumer information.

